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A B S T R A C T
This article examines whether there is a political budget
cycle (PBC) in countries in the euro area. Using a multivari-
ate model for 1999–2004 and various election indicators we
find strong evidence that, since the start of the Stability and
Growth Pact, fiscal policy-makers in the euro area have
pursued expansionary policies before elections. In an elec-
tion year – but not in the year prior to the election – the
budget deficit increases. This result is in line with third-
generation PBC models, which are based on moral hazard.
We also find a significant but small partisan effect on fiscal
policy outcomes.
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It is often thought that incumbents try to use expansionary ﬁscal policy before
elections to increase their popularity. However, most empirical studies exam-
ining the existence of a political budget cycle (PBC)1 in industrial countries
ﬁnd little support for such election-driven ﬁscal policy manipulations.2 Some
of these studies examine whether a PBC exists in member countries of the
European Union (EU). For example, Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) investigate
whether incumbent governments manipulated ﬁscal policy in order to
enhance their re-election prospects. Their empirical evidence for the 1970–98
period does not support this hypothesis. De Haan and Sturm (1994), who
examine ﬁscal policy in the European Community during the 1980s, also ﬁnd
no support for PBCs. However, other studies focusing on the ‘old’ member
countries of the EU claim that in more recent years ﬁscal policy has often
turned expansionary before elections. For instance, Buti and Van den Noord
(2003) report electoral effects based on an examination of the discretionary
part of ﬁscal policy over the 1999–2002 period. Also Von Hagen (2003)
concludes that there is evidence for a PBC in EU member countries. For the
period 1998–2002 he ﬁnds that the (unweighted) average ﬁscal impulse in
pre-election years was signiﬁcantly higher than the average ﬁscal impulse in
all other country-year cases.3
The results of these last two papers are somewhat surprising since
member countries of the EU are restricted in their ﬁscal policies by the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP consists of two Council Regu-
lations: one on the strengthening of the surveillance and coordination of
budgetary positions, and the other on speeding up and clarifying the imple-
mentation of the excessive deﬁcit procedure. A corresponding European
Council Resolution ties them together. Regulation 1466/97 sets out to
strengthen multilateral surveillance and gives member states a goal of a
medium-term budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus. Regulation
1467/97 clariﬁes and accelerates the excessive deﬁcit procedure as speciﬁed
in the Maastricht Treaty so that – in principle – within 10 months non-interest-
bearing deposits and ultimately ﬁnes can be imposed if the member state
concerned takes no effective actions to redress so-called excessive deﬁcits
(measured against reference values of 3% of GDP for the general government
budget deﬁcit and 60% for the general government debt-to-GDP ratio).4
According to Buti and Van den Noord (2003: 4), the SGP ‘is unquestionably
the most stringent supranational “commitment technology” ever adopted by
sovereign governments on a voluntary basis in the attempt to establish and
maintain sound public ﬁnances. The SGP, if applied according to its letter and
spirit, will have important implications for the behaviour of budgetary auth-
orities in both the short term (cyclical stabilization, policy co-ordination) and
long term (sustainability of public ﬁnances).’
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This paper examines whether there really exists a PBC in EU member
countries in the euro area. We focus on EU members that have adopted the
euro because the rules of the SGP are less strict for member countries that are
not part of the currency union. In contrast to Buti and Van den Noord (2003)
and Von Hagen (2003), we use a multivariate model. Furthermore, instead of
employing election dummies – like most previous PBC studies – we use an
election variable suggested by Franzese (2000) that takes the timing of an
election in the course of a year into account. On the basis of data for the period
1999–2004, we ﬁnd strong evidence that the SGP has not restricted ﬁscal
policy-makers in the euro area in pursuing expansionary policies before elec-
tions. In an election year – but not in the year prior to the election – the budget
deﬁcit increases. This result is in line with third-generation PBC models,
which are based on moral hazard. We also ﬁnd that the political composition
of the government has a signiﬁcant (but small) inﬂuence on net lending.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After offering some
theoretical considerations and reviewing previous empirical studies, we
outline the empirical model. The fourth section contains the main results and
the ﬁfth section presents the outcomes of various sensitivity tests. The ﬁnal
section offers some concluding comments.
Theoretical considerations and previous empirical studies
Three generations of theoretical PBC models can be distinguished.5 The ﬁrst-
generation models emphasize the incumbent government’s intention to
secure re-election by maximizing its expected vote share at the next election
(Nordhaus, 1975). It is assumed that the electorate is backward looking and
evaluates the government on the basis of its past track record. As a result,
these models imply that governments, regardless of ideological orientation,
adopt expansionary ﬁscal policies in the late year(s) of their term in ofﬁce in
order to stimulate the economy.
The second-generation models – Shi and Svensson (2004) call them
adverse-selection-type models – emphasize the role of temporary infor-
mation asymmetries regarding the politicians’ competence level in explain-
ing electoral cycles in ﬁscal policy. In these models, signalling is the driving
force behind the PBC. The ﬁrst of these models is due to Rogoff and Sibert
(1988), who assume that each political candidate has a competence level (high
or low) that is known only to the politician and not to the electorate. Voters
want to elect the more competent politician and form rational expectations
regarding the incumbent’s type based on observable current ﬁscal policy
outcomes. Before the election, high-type incumbents will attempt to signal
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their type (and thereby increase their chances of re-election) by engaging in
expansionary ﬁscal policy, which is less ‘costly’ for them than it is for low-
type incumbents. This leads to a pre-election increase in the government
deﬁcit when competent politicians are in ofﬁce. Rogoff (1990) argues that
incumbents can also signal their competence before an election by shifting
government expenditure towards easily observed consumption spending and
away from investment. As pointed out by Shi and Svensson (2004), some of
the implications of the signalling models seem to be at odds with both empiri-
cal and anecdotal evidence. For example, only more competent politicians
(rather than less competent ones) distort the economy in the separating equi-
librium of the signalling game. Likewise, only competent politicians will be
re-elected. Furthermore, since only competent types signal by creating a boom
before an election, the testable implications are unclear without additional
information on the (unobservable) type of the incumbent.
These drawbacks do not apply to the third-generation PBC models, which
are based on moral hazard. Examples of such studies are Persson and Tabellini
(2000) and Shi and Svensson (2002). As in the adverse-selection models, each
politician has some competence level that is unknown to the electorate.
Additionally, it is assumed that politicians cannot observe their competence
level ex ante either. That is, politicians are uncertain about how well they will
be able to handle future problems. Voters are rational and therefore want to
elect the most competent politicians because that would imply higher levels
of post-election public goods production. The constituents’ inference is based
on the observable macroeconomic performance of the incumbent government.
The key assumption is that the incumbent government can exert a hidden
effort, that is, use a policy instrument unobservable to the public that is a
substitute for competence. For example, if competence measures how well
politicians can convert revenues into public goods, the hidden effort can be
interpreted as the government’s short-term excess borrowing. Elections take
place after the incumbent government’s hidden effort and competence have
jointly determined the observable macroeconomic outcome. The incumbent
government would like to increase its performance index by exerting more
effort (borrowing more), hoping that voters will attribute the boost in public
goods provision to its competence. In the equilibrium of this moral hazard
game, there will be an excessive effort on the part of the incumbent politicians,
and, as a result, there is an increase in the budget deﬁcit prior to an election.
In these models, all types of incumbent government will incur excessive pre-
election budget deﬁcits (independent of their competence level). As Shi and
Svensson (2004) point out, one can test these empirical predictions whether or
not the type of the incumbent government is observable. Furthermore, the
implications of this model can be tested for all democratic countries, irrespec-
tive of their political structure (e.g. the existence of partisan differences).
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Brender and Drazen (2005) argue that until recently a PBC was generally
thought to be a phenomenon of less developed economies. For instance,
Schuknecht (1996) reports evidence for a PBC in his sample of 35 developing
countries over the period 1970–92 and Block (2002) ﬁnds for a cross-section of
44 sub-Saharan African countries that the government ﬁscal deﬁcit increases
by 1.2 percentage points in election years. Likewise, Schuknecht (2000) ﬁnds
for a sample of 24 developing countries for the 1973–92 period that incumbent
governments tend to increase public investment prior to elections. Hallerberg
et al. (2002) consider whether political business cycles existed in East European
accession countries during the period 1990–9. They ﬁnd that governments of
accession countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime manipulate their
economy in election years through running larger budgets.
However, some recent studies present evidence for the existence of a PBC
in a large cross-section of both developed and developing countries. For
instance, Shi and Svensson (2002) show that signiﬁcant pre-electoral increases
in the government budget deﬁcit exist for their panel of 91 developing and
developed countries over the period 1975–95. Moreover, Persson and Tabellini
(2002) report statistically signiﬁcant tax decreases before elections in a sample
of 60 democracies over the period 1960–98. Brender and Drazen (2005)
suggest, however, that the results of these studies are driven by the experi-
ence of so-called ‘new democracies’, where ﬁscal manipulation may be effec-
tive because of a lack of experience with electoral politics in these countries.
They argue that, once the ‘new democracies’ are removed from the sample,
the PBC disappears. Nonetheless, some recent studies focusing on ‘estab-
lished democracies’ ﬁnd evidence for the existence of a PBC. For instance, Alt
and Lassen (2006) argue that among advanced democracies signiﬁcant oppor-
tunistic electoral cycles are conditional on the transparency of budget insti-
tutions. In countries with less transparent institutions the electoral cycle in
ﬁscal policy appears, whereas no such election-related ﬁscal policy move-
ments show up in higher-transparency countries. However, Tujula and
Wolswijk (2004) ﬁnd support for a PBC independently of ﬁscal institutions in
their sample of OECD countries for the period 1970–2002. Likewise, Buti and
Van den Noord (2003) and Von Hagen (2003) claim that ﬁscal policy in EU
member countries turns expansionary before elections despite the introduc-
tion of the SGP. In the following sections we will examine whether there are
indeed political budget cycles in the euro area.
Empirical model and data
In the PBC literature, several indicators of ﬁscal policy have been suggested.
The three measures most often used are net lending, cyclically adjusted net
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lending, and the primary budget balance. As part of the sensitivity analysis
presented below we have employed all these measures, but in reporting our
main ﬁndings we primarily focus on net lending. The cyclically adjusted
budget balance suffers from the fact that there is no consensus on how it
should be computed; ﬁgures provided by various international organizations
often show large differences. Furthermore, De Haan et al. (2004) demonstrate
that OECD ﬁgures on cyclically adjusted balances are subject to large
revisions for a rather long time after their initial publication. Because we are
focusing on a very recent time period, we therefore prefer to use unadjusted
ﬁgures. The primary balance has the advantage that it excludes interest
payments, which are not controlled by the government. However, although
interest payments are more or less exogenous, policy-makers can cut other
expenditures if interest payments rise; a reluctance to do so during an election
year should certainly be considered relevant from a PBC perspective.
Some indicative evidence for the existence of a PBC in the euro area is
shown in Table 1, which presents an overview of the budget balances for all
countries in the currency union for the period 1999–2004. Figures for the 20
election years are in bold. It immediately becomes clear that all countries,
with the exception of Portugal, had on average lower budget balances during
election years than during years without a parliamentary election. The
(unweighted) average budget balance for all election years in the sample
equals –1.4%, whereas for election years it is –0.5%. The t-statistic for the
difference between the two values is 1.42, which is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
However, in order to draw more compelling conclusions regarding PBCs in
the euro area, a model is required that takes into account other potentially
relevant determinants of the budget balance.
Apart from electoral inﬂuences, our empirical model accounts for two
factors that are not directly controlled by policy-makers but that affect ﬁscal
policy outcomes. First, to ﬁlter automatic stabilization effects from our ﬁscal
policy measure, we include the output gap as a proxy for the business cycle.
An economic upswing will lead to an increase in the budget balance, whereas
in the downward phase of the business cycle the balance usually deteriorates.
Because there is no consensus in the literature on how to construct the output
gap, we use output gaps based on potential GDP as well as on trend GDP,
both calculated by the European Commission.
Second, since unforeseen economic developments may affect ﬁscal policy
outcomes, we include the difference between actual and expected real GDP
growth. The expected growth rates are the GDP growth forecasts available at
the time the government budget was decided upon. A higher than expected
growth rate will lead to an increase in the budget balance owing to, amongst
other things, unexpected increases in tax receipts. Likewise, unexpected
inﬂation may have an effect on the budget balance. As pointed out by Tujula
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and Wolswijk (2004), inﬂation may affect government receipts and expendi-
tures through nominal progression in tax rates and tax brackets, and via price
indexation of receipts and expenditures. On the other hand, unexpected inﬂa-
tion erodes the real value of nominal government debt so that the overall
effect of inﬂation on the budget balance is not clear a priori.
After accounting for the effects of business cycle ﬂuctuations and fore-
casting errors in GDP growth and inﬂation, all remaining changes in the
budget balance are considered to be the result of discretionary ﬁscal policy.
These considerations suggest estimating the following equation:
, (1)
where ∆BBit is the change in country is overall budget balance as measured
by the change in net lending; yit – yit
f stands for the difference between actual
real GDP growth at time t and real growth as forecast at the time ﬁscal policy
for year t was determined; πit – πit
f represents the difference between actual
inﬂation at time t and inﬂation as forecast at the time ﬁscal policy for year t
was determined; ∆GAPit measures the change in the output gap in year t as
a percentage of GDP.
∆
∆
BB y y
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Table 1 Net lending (% GDP) in EMU member states: 1999–2004
Non-
Election election All
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 years years years
Austria –2.3 –1.5 0.3 –0.2 –1.1 –1.3 –1.3 –0.9 –1.0
Belgium –0.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2
Finland 2.2 7.1 5.2 4.3 2.5 2.1 2.4 4.7 3.9
France –1.8 –1.4 –1.5 –3.2 –4.2 –3.7 –3.2 –2.5 –2.6
Germany –1.5 1.3 –2.8 –3.7 –3.8 –3.7 –3.7 –2.1 –2.4
Greece –3.4 –4.1 –3.6 –4.1 –5.2 –6.1 –5.1 –4.1 –4.4
Ireland 2.6 4.4 0.9 –0.4 0.2 1.3 –0.4 1.9 1.5
Italy –1.7 –0.6 –3.0 –2.6 –2.9 –3.0 –3.0 –2.2 –2.3
Luxembourg 3.4 6.2 6.2 2.3 0.5 –1.1 1.2 3.8 2.9
Netherlands 0.7 2.2 –0.1 –1.9 –3.2 –2.5 –2.6 0.1 –0.8
Portugal –2.8 –2.8 –4.4 –2.7 –2.9 –2.9 –2.8 –3.3 –3.1
Spain –1.2 –0.9 –0.5 –0.3 0.3 –0.3 –0.6 –0.4 –0.5
Average
(unweighted) –0.5 0.8 –0.2 –1.0 –1.6 –1.8 –1.4 –0.5 –0.7
Sources: see appendix on the EUP webpage.
In order to take account of potential election effects, two alternative indi-
cators are considered. The ﬁrst involves adding a dummy to the equation that
indicates whether a year is an election year or not (DElection year). A similar
dummy is used to account for pre-election years. Because ﬁscal policy
decisions may take some time to have an effect, election-induced ﬁscal
measures could be taken in the year prior to the actual election.
The second indicator takes the timing of an election in the course of the
year into account. It has been developed by Franzese (2000) and is calculated
as:
ELE = [(M – 1) + d/D]/12, (2)
where M is the month of the election, d is the day of the election and D is the
number of days in that month. For the year prior to the election year, the indi-
cator is calculated as:
ELE = [12 – (M – 1) – d/D]/12. (3)
In all other years its value is set to zero. For reasons that will become clear
later, we want to be able to interpret the values of the election indicator in
terms of actual election dates. This means that an indicator value of, for
instance, 7/12 in an election year as well as a value of 5/12 in a pre-election
year implies that elections take place at the end of July. In general, this requires
that snap elections are ignored because the length of the period during which
election-driven policy manipulations can occur – that is, the period between a
government crisis and the early election – does not say anything at all about
the actual election date because it usually does not amount to exactly 365
days. As a result of these considerations, 19 observations for election years
and 12 observations for pre-election years can be used in calculating the
election indicator.
The macroeconomic data necessary to estimate the model have been
obtained from stability programmes of the EU countries and ofﬁcial publi-
cations of the European Commission. Data on general election dates are
mainly taken from political data yearbooks (Katz and Koole, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003; and Van Biezen and Katz, 2004). The sample contains obser-
vations for all 12 countries in the euro area – Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain – over the time period 1999–2004. The appendix, which
can be found on the EUP webpage, contains a detailed overview of the data
sources used.
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Results
Columns I and II of Table 2 present benchmark regressions that contain only
the economic control variables. The difference between the regressions is the
output gap variable used; in column I this variable is constructed on the basis
of potential output, whereas in column II it is calculated on the basis of trend
income. It follows that only the coefﬁcients for the output gap measures are
signiﬁcantly different from zero. For each regressor, including the constant,
an F-test was performed to test whether common coefﬁcients could be
assumed over all cross-sections in the sample. In all cases, the test failed to
reject the null hypothesis of poolability.
In columns III and IV, a pre-election year dummy is added to the model.
In both speciﬁcations the election coefﬁcients have a negative sign but are not
very signiﬁcant. Moreover, the ﬁt of the model does not improve substan-
tially compared with the benchmark regressions. However, this changes when
the pre-election year dummy is replaced by an election year dummy (columns
V and VI). Now the adjusted R2 rises to about .46 and the election effect is
highly signiﬁcant. Also an unexpected increase in GDP growth has a positive
and signiﬁcant effect on the budget balance. However, the coefﬁcient of unex-
pected inﬂation remains insigniﬁcant. Finally, columns VII and VIII of Table
2 present speciﬁcations in which pre-election as well as election year dummies
are included. The pre-election year dummy becomes somewhat more signiﬁ-
cant than before, but the ﬁt of the model decreases slightly compared with
the speciﬁcation in which only an election year dummy is taken into account.
Table 3 presents the results that are obtained when possible election
effects are modelled more accurately, that is, by means of the election indica-
tor as suggested by Franzese (2000). In columns I and II an indicator is added
with the superscript ‘standard’, which comprises both pre-election and
election years. The coefﬁcients of the output gap and unexpected GDP growth
are signiﬁcantly different from zero. There is also a highly signiﬁcant election
effect. If the election variable is decomposed into separate effects for pre-
election and election years, the same pattern as in Table 2 becomes visible.
Columns III and IV of Table 3 show that there is no effect in the pre-election
year, while columns V and VI indicate the existence of a highly signiﬁcant
effect during the election year. This is underlined by the high adjusted R2.
Columns VII and VIII of Table 3 show that including the two indicators simul-
taneously does not lead to a signiﬁcant effect during pre-election years.
Hence, our results suggest that only during the election year does the
budget deﬁcit increase. This increase amounts to 0.96% of GDP according to
the model with the election year dummy and 0.83% of GDP according to the
model with the election year indicator.6 The latter ﬁgure is obtained by
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Table 2 Estimation results: Election dummy
Dependent variable BB
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Equation No. I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Constant .0611 .0306 .1454 .1109 .2818 .2515 .4126 .3820
(.5072) (.7422) (.1568) (.2871) (.0002)*** (.0011)*** (.0000)*** (.0001)***
y – y f .2233 .1813 .2339 .2093 .3420 .3174 .3292 .3162
(.1503) (.2474) (.1247) (.1744) (.0044)*** (.0101)** (.0107)** (.0190)**
 – f –.0350 –.0743 –.0246 –.0670 –.0332 –.0473 –.0759 –.0917
(.8070) (.5894) (.8816) (.6864) (.7547) (.6383) (.5882) (.5202)
GAPPotential GDP .2496 . – .2335 .  – .1898 .    – .1723 .  –
(.0702)* (.1084) (.0593)* (.1296)
GAPTrend GDP .  – .3055 .  – .2740 .  – .2180 .  – .1871
(.0203)** (.0434)** (.0298)** (.1018)
DPre-election year .  – . – –.4928 –.4569 .  – .    – –.5814 –.5597
(.0775)* (.1014) (.0134)** (.0184)**
DElection year .  – . – .  – .  – –.9541 –.9284 –.9726 –.9556
(.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)***
Durbin–Watson stat. 2.13 2.17 2.18 2.21 2.04 2.04 2.18 2.18
Adjusted R2 .20 .22 .25 .25 .46 .47 .45 .44
Notes: Balanced sample of 72 observations and 12 cross-sections; panel generalized least squares (cross-section weights) with common effects; White
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance; p-values in parentheses: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3 Estimation results: Election indicator
Dependent variable BB
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Equation No. I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Constant .2589 .2154 .0810 .0453 .2346 .2039 .2796 .2409
(.0069)*** (.0238)** (.4294) (.6634) (.0008)*** (.0042)*** (.0008)*** (.0039)***
y – y f .2607 .2405 .2202 .1914 .3203 .2935 .3039 .2876
(.0520)* (.0734)* (.1556) (.2230) (.0061)*** (.0130)** (.0134)** (.0221)**
 – f –.0143 –.0553 –.0345 –.0761 –.0246 –.0501 –.0176 –.0504
(.9354) (.7200) (.8324) (.6383) (.8205) (.6225) (.8958) (.7075)
GAPPotential GDP .2558 .   – .2575 .    – .2363 .  – .2641 .  –
(.0253)** (.0731)* (.0215)** (.0172)**
GAPTrend GDP .   – .3063 .   – .2973 .    – .2603 .  – .2724
(.0094)*** (.0276)*** (.0085)*** (.0105)**
ELEStandard –1.2285 –1.1732 .   – .    – .    – .  – .  – .  –
(.0007)*** (.0012)**
ELEPre-election year .   – .   – –.3778 –.3229 .    – .  – –.6139 –.5648
(.3745) (.4352) (.1023) (.1262)
ELEElection year .   – .   – .   – .    – –2.2148 –2.2003 –2.2595 –2.2254
(.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)***
Durbin–Watson stat. 2.27 2.31 2.16 2.20 2.17 2.19 2.24 2.26
Adjusted R2 .38 .37 .20 .21 .47 .49 .45 .45
Notes: Balanced sample of 72 observations and 12 cross-sections; panel generalized least squares (cross-section weights) with common effects; White
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance; p-values in parentheses: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
multiplying the coefﬁcient estimate for the election year indicator obtained
in column VI of Table 3 by the average value of the indicator over all election
years (which is 0.38 in our sample).
At ﬁrst sight it seems rather peculiar that there exists such a large differ-
ence between the effects of pre-election and election years. This is especially
surprising since the average value for all pre-election year indicators in the
sample is 0.65, indicating that in general a large fraction of the 365-day period
prior to elections in our sample was part of the pre-election year. However,
there is a plausible explanation for this phenomenon that can be derived from
the third-generation PBC models as outlined above. In these models, it is
assumed that the government uses short-term excess borrowing as a hidden
effort – that is, as a policy instrument unobservable to the electorate – in order
to increase its performance index. Borrowing extra money during a pre-
election year is less easy to hide in comparison with borrowing during an
election year because information on the pre-election year’s budget deﬁcit is
likely to be published prior to the election date. As a result, the policy instru-
ment is no longer unobservable since all excess government borrowing will
be noticed by the electorate. Consequently, the increase in the government’s
performance index will not take place. In fact, the index might even decline
if the electorate strongly prefers budgetary discipline.7
The mechanism described above also implies that the relationship
between the timing of an election during the year and electorally induced
ﬁscal policy manipulations is non-monotonic. There is a trade-off between
two effects: a higher value of the election year measure indicates that during
that year there is ample time for the government to increase its performance
index, but a higher value of the election year variable also indicates that it
will be more difﬁcult for the government adequately to hide its efforts from
the electorate since more reliable statistics on the size of the budget balance
are available to the public.
To test this further, we transform the election year indicator into two
dummy variables. The ﬁrst dummy (DElection in Q1/Q4) is given a value of 1 if
an election took place during the ﬁrst or last quarter of the year; in all other
cases its value is set to 0. The second dummy variable is constructed in the
same way, but indicates whether an election took place during the second or
third quarter. If the hypothesized trade-off indeed exists, the election effect
should be strongest for observations covered by the second dummy variable.
Columns I and II of Table 4 present the results. Clearly, both models ﬁt the
data substantially better than the models estimated before, and the coefﬁcient
estimates for both dummy variables suggest that the relationship between the
change in net lending and the value of the election year indicator is non-linear.
This is further supported by the results from columns III and IV, which
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Table 4 Estimation results: Election year indicator with non-linear effect
Dependent variable BB
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Equation No. I II III IV V VI
Constant .2409 .2223 .2565 .2321 –.4433 –.4102
(.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0001)*** (.0166)** (.0278)**
y – y f .3761 .3634 .3621 .3444 .3116 .3108
(.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0002)*** (.0006)*** (.0005)*** (.0011)***
 – f –.0123 –.0351 .0084 –.0129 –.0354 –.0750
(.8882) (.6841) (.9296) (.8867) (.6739) (.3887)
GAPPotential GDP .1846 .    – .2009 .    – .2981 .    –
(.0069)*** (.0138)** (.0002)***
GAPTrend GDP .    – .1876 .    – .2140 .    – .2785
(.0056)*** (.0076)*** (.0003)***
DElection in Q1/Q4 –.3725 –.3803 .    – .    – .    – .    –
(.1306) (.0933)*
DElection in Q2/Q3 –1.2891 –1.2621 .    – .    – .    – .    –
(.0000)*** (.0000)***
ELEElection year .    – .    – –5.4486 –5.2460 –5.5918 –5.2627
(.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)***
(ELEElection year)2 .    – .    – 6.0190 5.7320 6.4389 5.9783
(.0001)*** (.0001)*** (.0000)*** (.0000)***
GCOL .    – .    – .    – .    – .0638 .0582
.    – .    – (.0002)*** (.0007)***
Durbin–Watson stat. 2.16 2.16 2.10 2.10 2.12 2.13
Adjusted R2 .70 .68 .61 .61 .69 .67
Notes: Balanced sample of 72 observations and 12 cross-sections; panel generalized least squares (cross-section weights) with common effects; White
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance; p-values in parentheses: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
account for a non-linear election effect by using a squared election year indi-
cator in addition to the original one. The model ﬁt is quite good, and the coef-
ﬁcients for the election year variables are highly signiﬁcant.8 The pattern that
can be derived from the coefﬁcient estimates for the election effect (based on
column III of Table 4) is depicted in Figure 1. The graph shows that ﬁscal
policy becomes more expansionary when the election date is closer to the
middle of the year.
Sensitivity analysis
In order to test the robustness of our results with respect to sample compo-
sition, we estimated equations III and IV of Table 4 12 times, each time exclud-
ing one country from the sample. Although the exclusion of France results in
an insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient for the unexpected growth variable,9 the election
effect is always highly signiﬁcant (results available on request).
In addition, we estimated speciﬁcations III and IV using alternative indi-
cators of ﬁscal policy that have been suggested in the literature as the depen-
dent variable. First, while excluding the output gap as a regressor, we used
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Figure 1 Graphical representation of the election year effect.
cyclically adjusted changes in net lending. Second, we employed the level of
net lending while adopting the output gap level instead of the change therein
as a regressor. And, third, we used changes in the primary balance. In all
cases, the outcomes were highly comparable to the ones originally obtained,
the election year effect being slightly weaker in the ﬁrst case, somewhat
stronger in the second, and virtually unchanged in the third (results are avail-
able on request).
Next, we examined whether our ﬁndings are inﬂuenced by the inclusion
of variables reﬂecting political-institutional conditions that have been
suggested to affect ﬁscal policy. Therefore, in speciﬁcation III of Table 4 we
included variables reﬂecting (i) the type of government, (ii) the fractionaliza-
tion of government, and (iii) the positioning of the government on a
Left–Right scale.10
Since Roubini and Sachs (1989), various studies have examined the
impact of the type of government on ﬁscal policy outcomes. The basic idea
is that coalition governments are weaker than single-party majoritarian
governments and therefore will end up with higher deﬁcits if the country
concerned is hit by a negative economic shock. Roubini and Sachs (1989)
present evidence in support of this view, but other studies reject the hypoth-
esis (see, for example, De Haan and Sturm, 1997). To take the type of govern-
ment into account, we constructed a dummy, which is 1 in the case of a
single-party government and 0 in all other cases. It turned out that the
dummy’s coefﬁcient was positive but highly insigniﬁcant, with a p-value of
.54. The other results remained unchanged.
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) argue that the fractionalization of govern-
ment – measured by the number of political parties or the number of spending
ministers in government – affects ﬁscal policy. The more fragmented the
government, i.e. the greater the number of parties or spending ministers, the
higher will be the budget deﬁcit. There is quite a lot of support for this view
(see, for instance, Volkerink and De Haan, 2001). Therefore, the number of
political parties in government and the number of spending ministers in
government were separately included in the regressions. They both failed to
reach signiﬁcance (p-values of .18 and .91, respectively) and did not affect the
election effect.
As Franzese (2000) puts it, at least since Hibbs (1977) political economists
have argued that parties of the Right and Left differ in their ﬁscal policy prior-
ities. Speciﬁcally, left-wing governments favour larger public economies,
greater redistribution and more Keynesian expansion, and so are expected to
run greater deﬁcits than right-wing governments. Since several empirical
studies indeed suggest that the political colour of a government affects ﬁscal
policy outcomes (see Franzese, 2002, for a discussion), the inﬂuence of the
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government’s positioning on a Left–Right scale was also taken into account.
This was done by constructing the variable GCOL, which uses a scaling from
1 for ultra-left to 20 for ultra-right governments. Data on party colour were
obtained from Benoit and Laver (2005). The estimation results are presented
in columns V and VI of Table 4. The political composition of the government
does indeed have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the change in net lending.
However, this inﬂuence is rather small. Again, adding this variable does not
substantially affect the coefﬁcient of our election variables.
Finally, some speciﬁc non-political variables were added to the model as
a further robustness test. A number of previous studies have suggested that
there may be asymmetries in ﬁscal responses to recessions and upturns. For
instance, Mayes and Viren (2000) argue that during recessions governments
pursue expansionary ﬁscal policies to combat the downturn, whereas during
economic upswings the proceeds are used for cutting taxes or increasing
spending rather than for additional consolidation. Therefore, a dummy is
constructed that is 1 in the case of a positive change in the output gap and 0
otherwise. Because it is highly insigniﬁcant, with a p-value of .77, there is no
reason to assume that ﬁscal policy responds differently in magnitude to
positive changes in the output gap than to negative changes. Including the
variable did not affect our other results.
The debt-to-GDP ratio was also added to the model because it may
capture concerns about the sustainability of ﬁscal policy (Tujula and Wolswijk,
2004). From a sustainability perspective, increasing debt ratios should lead to
an improvement in the budget balance. In fact, Melitz (2000) suggests the use
of a quadratic formulation for the debt ratio because higher debt levels may
induce more stabilizing ﬁscal reactions. However, a higher debt ratio also
causes a rise in interest payments, resulting in a worsening ﬁscal balance. As
a consequence, the overall effect of the debt ratio on budget balances is not
a priori clear. Indeed, the coefﬁcients of the level and the squared level of the
debt-to-GDP ratio are insigniﬁcant, with p-values between .15 and .22. Again,
the election effect remains unchanged.
Conclusions
As Buti and Van den Noord (2003) point out, in the run-up to the monetary
union the incentives for national policy-makers to stick to the announced
consolidation path were quite strong because failure to meet the convergence
criteria carried the penalty of exclusion from the euro area. This was
considered too harsh a political sanction. However, things may be different
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once a country has been admitted to the monetary union. That is, unlike the
Maastricht convergence criteria, sticking to the rules of the SGP may not pay
politically. This holds true especially for large countries (see De Haan et al.,
2004). Moreover, the adoption of ﬁscal consolidation policies during the run-
up to the monetary union might have actually created the room for ma-
noeuvre for politically motivated ﬁscal actions.
This article has examined whether there is a PBC in EU member countries
in the euro area despite the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact. We
have concentrated on EU members that have adopted the euro because the
rules of the SGP are less strict for member countries that are not part of the
currency union. We use a more sophisticated approach than previous studies
that focused on the recent ﬁscal policy experience of EU member countries.
Using data for the period 1999–2004, we have found strong evidence that the
SGP did not withold policy-makers from pursuing expansionary ﬁscal policies
before elections. In an election year – but not in the year prior to the election
– the budget deﬁcit increases. This result is in line with third-generation PBC
models, which are based on moral hazard. We have also concluded that ﬁscal
policy is somewhat more expansionary under left-wing policy-makers.
Finally, two important caveats are in order. First, since the currency union
started only six years ago, our analysis is based on a short sample period.
Nonetheless, given the relatively large number of elections in the period
1999–2004 – all countries had general elections as part of the regular electoral
cycle – our evidence clearly indicates the existence of electorally motivated
ﬁscal policies. Second, our analysis is based on aggregate measures of discre-
tionary ﬁscal policy and may therefore not fully capture PBCs. Governments
may lower taxes or give extra subsidies to special interest groups in order to
maximize the probability of being re-elected, and such changes may not show
up in aggregated data. A suggestion for future research is therefore to use
more disaggregated measures of discretionary ﬁscal policies.
Notes
We would like to thank the participants in the SOM workshop (19–20 May 2005,
Groningen, the Netherlands) and four anonymous referees for their helpful
suggestions regarding previous versions of the article.
1 A political budget cycle is a periodic ﬂuctuation in a government’s ﬁscal
policies, which is induced by the cyclicality of elections. Shi and Svensson
(2004) review some recent developments in the theory and evidence of these
cycles. See also Franzese (2002) and Drazen (2001) for extensive reviews of
the literature.
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2 There are exceptions, however. For instance, Alesina et al. (1997), who
perform cross-section time series regressions on a panel of 13 OECD countries
for the period 1961–93, ﬁnd that the government budget deﬁcit is 0.6% of
GDP higher in election years. Also Franzese (2000) reports evidence for elec-
toral manipulation of ﬁscal policy in his sample of 20 OECD countries.
3 However, the evidence of Von Hagen is not very convincing. For instance, he
takes both presidential and parliamentary elections into account even though
presidents in some countries have hardly any inﬂuence on policy-making. De
Haan et al. (2003) could not replicate his ﬁndings.
4 See Amtenbrink and De Haan (2003) for an extensive discussion of the SGP.
De Haan et al. (2004) examine the weaknesses of the SGP. See also Schuknecht
(2004).
5 The ﬁrst part of this section heavily draws on Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) and
Shi and Svensson (2004). See Lohmann (1998) for an analysis of monetary
policy.
6 This conclusion is not affected by the exclusion of snap elections in calculat-
ing the election indicators (results available on request).
7 There is some evidence (see, for instance, Brender, 2003) suggesting that a
deterioration in the ﬁnancial position of the government harms the incum-
bent’s chances of re-election. Brender (2003) argues that this should be the
case in all ‘well developed democracies’ where voters can monitor the evolu-
tion of public ﬁnances. Drazen and Eslava (2003) try to reconcile this ﬁscal
conservativeness and the PBC.
8 A caveat is in order here since the sample contains only three observations
for which the election year indicator has a value greater than .5. However,
the squared election indicator becomes insigniﬁcant only when all three of
these observations are removed, making it unlikely that it is based on an
outlier. Hence, even though all other results also suggest a non-linear election
effect, further research into the non-linear effect is warranted once more data
are available.
9 This could be the result of collinearity between forecasting errors in growth
rates and changes in the output gap since the correlation between both vari-
ables is .75. However, this does not affect our main conclusions because both
regressors are used only as control variables meant to pick up the impact of
non-discretion ﬁscal policy on the budget balance.
10 We did not include an indicator of budgetary institutions because ﬁgures are
not available for all countries over our estimation period. See, for instance,
Hallerberg (2004) for a discussion.
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